{"paper":{"title":"Computation of Approximately Stable Committees in Approval-based Elections","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DM"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Drew Gao, Jan Vondr\\'ak, Yihang Sun","submitted_at":"2025-07-31T19:36:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \\subset \\mathcal{C}$ of approved candidates. For any committee size $K$, the goal is to choose $K$ candidates to represent the voters' preferences. We study a criterion known as \\emph{approximate stability}, where a committee is $\\lambda$-approximately-stable if there is no other committee $T$ preferred by at least $\\frac{\\lambda|T|}{k} |\\mathcal{V}| $ voters. We prove that a $3.65$-"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2508.00130","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2508.00130/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}