{"paper":{"title":"Adversarial Wiretap Channel with Public Discussion","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Pengwei Wang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini","submitted_at":"2014-03-22T01:02:09Z","abstract_excerpt":"Wyner's elegant model of wiretap channel exploits noise in the communication channel to provide perfect secrecy against a computationally unlimited eavesdropper without requiring a shared key. We consider an adversarial model of wiretap channel proposed in [18,19] where the adversary is active: it selects a fraction $\\rho_r$ of the transmitted codeword to eavesdrop and a fraction $\\rho_w$ of the codeword to corrupt by \"adding\" adversarial error. It was shown that this model also captures network adversaries in the setting of 1-round Secure Message Transmission [8]. It was proved that secure co"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1403.5598","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}