{"paper":{"title":"Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"An impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain quantifies how far limited-privilege attackers can drive power-electronics nodes past stability limits.","cross_cats":["cs.AI","cs.SY"],"primary_cat":"eess.SY","authors_text":"Hongwei Zhen, Mingyang Sun, Wuhua Li, Xin Xiang, Ze Yu","submitted_at":"2026-05-14T07:47:43Z","abstract_excerpt":"Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"That feasible adversarial actions can be accurately represented as impedance reshaping operations and that the resulting critical-eigenvalue migration reliably indicates instability under privilege constraints.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"An Attack Reachable Domain and Attack Penetration Index quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability in power electronics by linking adversarial impedance changes to stability margin penetration.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"An impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain quantifies how far limited-privilege attackers can drive power-electronics nodes past stability limits.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"2a794cdcb5cb087e5c82b828948e2756452931184629c88076190880aba4742f"},"source":{"id":"2605.14502","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":"ffc5a1f3-84d8-4fef-99e7-433fc0c49fee","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-15T01:53:48.020268Z","strongest_claim":"Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space.","one_line_summary":"An Attack Reachable Domain and Attack Penetration Index quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability in power electronics by linking adversarial impedance changes to stability margin penetration.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"That feasible adversarial actions can be accurately represented as impedance reshaping operations and that the resulting critical-eigenvalue migration reliably indicates instability under privilege constraints.","pith_extraction_headline":"An impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain quantifies how far limited-privilege attackers can drive power-electronics nodes past stability limits."},"references":{"count":13,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":2021,"title":"Multilayer resilience paradigm against cyber attacks in dc microgrids,","work_id":"4496c685-a6dc-404a-9550-1fed30a7bc8e","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2025,"title":"Public history of solar energy cyberattacks and vulnerabil- ities,","work_id":"0c1f5259-4662-473b-84c3-c1c7235a5c03","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2025,"title":"Exploring smart grid vulnerability against intelligent inverter parameter tampering attack,","work_id":"0688f4fa-a208-449c-9072-ded73bbb8adf","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2022,"title":"Cybersecurity of smart inverters in the smart grid: A survey,","work_id":"a42f9376-a903-4a90-afa4-d920966df8fc","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2023,"title":"An overview of cyber-resilient smart in- verters based on practical attack models,","work_id":"f82bb4ec-c630-40d0-a8cf-d26a17403228","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":13,"snapshot_sha256":"eca895ef0e2ed0561b5b65a006b4053f503415d96cd41a4159a50131fdfeb014","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}