{"paper":{"title":"On the Role of External Constraints in a Spatially Extended Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cond-mat.stat-mech","authors_text":"Gyorgy Szabo, Michel Droz, Peter Szabo, Tibor Antal","submitted_at":"2002-05-28T15:12:35Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or \"tit for tat\" (T), and their total payoffs come from games with the nearest neighbors. During the random sequential updates the players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen neighbor has higher payoff. We compare the effect of two types of external constraints added to the Darwinian evolutionary processes. In both cases the strategy of a randomly chosen play"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"cond-mat/0205598","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}