{"paper":{"title":"A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Alon Eden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, S. Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2016-12-14T17:46:49Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \\cup T) < v(S) + v(T)$) and complements (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \\cup T) > v(S) + v(T)$). We show that the mechanism first proposed by Babaioff et al. [2014] - the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together - guarantees a $\\Theta(d)$ fraction of the optimal revenue, where $d$ is a measure on the degree of complementarity. Note that this is the first approximately optimal mechanism for a buy"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1612.04746","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}