{"paper":{"title":"Constitutional Governance in Metric Spaces","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","headline":"Constitutional governance in metric spaces integrates voting, proposal submission, and supermajority amendment into a single polynomial-time protocol that communities can run on personal devices.","cross_cats":["cs.AI","cs.DC","cs.GT","econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.MA","authors_text":"Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon","submitted_at":"2026-05-13T11:23:34Z","abstract_excerpt":"Computational social choice and algorithmic decision theory offer rich aggregation theory but no comprehensive process for egalitarian self-governance: aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus are each considered in isolation, with key metric-space aggregators being NP-hard. Here, we propose constitutional governance in metric spaces, integrating these stages into a coherent polynomial-time protocol for constitutional governance. The constitution assigns, per amendable component including itself, a metric space, aggregation rule, and supermajority threshold. Amendments proceed by me"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"We propose constitutional governance in metric spaces, integrating these stages into a coherent polynomial-time protocol for constitutional governance.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"That public proposals carrying supermajority support can be effectively sourced from deliberation, vote aggregation, or AI mediation, and that the generalized median rule ensures no misreport weakly dominates sincere voting at majority threshold.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"A polynomial-time constitutional governance protocol in metric spaces unifies aggregation, supermajority amendment, deliberation, and consensus for digital communities and organizations.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"Constitutional governance in metric spaces integrates voting, proposal submission, and supermajority amendment into a single polynomial-time protocol that communities can run on personal devices.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"650966560b7d6a6783b9c58a6887194befb8b3d810cfda9e6d6e4bef2b07ee9d"},"source":{"id":"2605.13362","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":"c8f65854-46af-4bdf-83eb-9a4ba0ec9ee9","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-15T05:54:27.773902Z","strongest_claim":"We propose constitutional governance in metric spaces, integrating these stages into a coherent polynomial-time protocol for constitutional governance.","one_line_summary":"A polynomial-time constitutional governance protocol in metric spaces unifies aggregation, supermajority amendment, deliberation, and consensus for digital communities and organizations.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"That public proposals carrying supermajority support can be effectively sourced from deliberation, vote aggregation, or AI mediation, and that the generalized median rule ensures no misreport weakly dominates sincere voting at majority threshold.","pith_extraction_headline":"Constitutional governance in metric spaces integrates voting, proposal submission, and supermajority amendment into a single polynomial-time protocol that communities can run on personal devices."},"references":{"count":30,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":2021,"title":"Abramowitz, B., Shapiro, E., Talmon, N.: In the beginning there werenagents: Founding and amending a constitution. In: Proc. of ADT’21. pp. 119–131 (2021) Constitutional Governance in Metric Spaces 15","work_id":"39aa0831-99b6-49ce-a3de-5a7b625297eb","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2018,"title":"Artificial Intelligence264, 27–51 (2018)","work_id":"b0cdaace-4b22-4abd-821d-0e94588f71c6","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":1948,"title":"Journal of Political Economy 56(1), 23–34 (1948)","work_id":"22ccf3b8-e78a-463d-83c7-b9092594af31","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2017,"title":"Social Choice and Welfare49(3–4), 657–669 (2017)","work_id":"b026124a-056a-4d8d-8dd0-588b45f5ca8c","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.4204/eptcs.437.32","year":2025,"title":"In: Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2025)","work_id":"20fe5c9c-4e0f-4c2c-8486-d75142b94bef","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":30,"snapshot_sha256":"3493d9aaa0e60d02c5d92eb6bd74382f5560eeff694e051ae8009bcb364e908a","internal_anchors":1},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}