{"paper":{"title":"A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"The PO-ASL mechanism synthesizes social laws that maximize expected profit while remaining incentive-compatible and individually rational.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chongjun Wang, Jian Huang, Jun Wu","submitted_at":"2026-05-16T07:36:08Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper studies Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic multi-agent environments as a new multi-unit mechanism design problem. We model SLS as a Bayesian single-parameter procurement auction based on Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and aim to design a truthful, individually rational, and profit-optimal mechanism. We first prove a representation lemma showing that any valuation respecting alternating bisimulation can be compactly expressed as a feature set of ATL formulae. We then reduce payment determination to allocation determination in polynomial time, resolving the irregular payme"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"We present the PO-ASL mechanism, which is incentive-compatible, individually rational, and maximizes expected profit.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"Any valuation respecting alternating bisimulation can be compactly expressed as a feature set of ATL formulae (the representation lemma invoked to enable the reduction from payment determination to allocation determination).","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"Presents the PO-ASL mechanism that synthesizes profit-optimal social laws for strategic agents by compactly representing ATL valuations, reducing payments to allocation, and solving the resulting FP^NP-complete problem with integer linear programming.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"The PO-ASL mechanism synthesizes social laws that maximize expected profit while remaining incentive-compatible and individually rational.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"a4bf16206a9cedfce8746bd1e30866e815ae94fa2614b116e75a8c2dd2e76578"},"source":{"id":"2605.16853","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":"c4b854f3-7447-4a77-8d4a-250de1e075d4","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-19T19:29:05.187029Z","strongest_claim":"We present the PO-ASL mechanism, which is incentive-compatible, individually rational, and maximizes expected profit.","one_line_summary":"Presents the PO-ASL mechanism that synthesizes profit-optimal social laws for strategic agents by compactly representing ATL valuations, reducing payments to allocation, and solving the resulting FP^NP-complete problem with integer linear programming.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"Any valuation respecting alternating bisimulation can be compactly expressed as a feature set of ATL formulae (the representation lemma invoked to enable the reduction from payment determination to allocation determination).","pith_extraction_headline":"The PO-ASL mechanism synthesizes social laws that maximize expected profit while remaining incentive-compatible and individually rational."},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2605.16853/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[{"name":"doi_title_agreement","ran_at":"2026-05-19T20:01:18.994203Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0},{"name":"doi_compliance","ran_at":"2026-05-19T19:40:47.429082Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0},{"name":"claim_evidence","ran_at":"2026-05-19T18:41:56.311841Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0},{"name":"ai_meta_artifact","ran_at":"2026-05-19T18:33:26.386104Z","status":"skipped","version":"1.0.0","findings_count":0}],"snapshot_sha256":"2d87077c654c4c03494a3ce179b40245cb2c4b703075cbbb94b090c0bc55d6a8"},"references":{"count":79,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":2009,"title":"T. ˚Agotnes, W. van der Hoek, M. Tennenholtz, and M. Wooldridge. Power in normative systems. InProceedings of AAMAS-09, pages 145–152, 2009","work_id":"5e016dde-161f-40f1-a311-482372747993","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2008,"title":"T. ˚Agotnes, W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge. Robust normative systems. InProceedings of AAMAS-08, pages 747–754, 2008","work_id":"df3f66a7-79c0-4b90-81d3-370ffa7d0286","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2010,"title":"T. ˚Agotnes and M. Wooldridge. Optimal social laws. 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