{"paper":{"title":"Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi, Tao Xiao, Yaonan Jin, Zhihao Gavin Tang","submitted_at":"2018-11-02T07:35:30Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, it extracts at least $\\frac{1}{2.62}$-fraction of revenue; there is a matching lower-bound example.\n  In the unit-demand single-buyer setting, we prove tight approximation ratio between the simplest and optimal deterministic mechanisms: in terms of revenue, uniform pricing admits a $2.62$-approximation of item pricing; we further validate the tightness of this ratio.\n  These results settle two open problems asked in~\\"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1811.00763","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}