{"paper":{"title":"On the Verification and Computation of Strong Nash Equilibrium","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Marco Rocco, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm","submitted_at":"2017-11-16T20:56:43Z","abstract_excerpt":"Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \\emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form coalitions, NE is inadequate and an appropriate solution concept is \\emph{strong Nash equilibrium} (SNE). Few computational results are known about SNE. In this paper, we first study the problem of verifying whether a strategy profile is an SNE, showing that the problem is in $\\mathcal{P}$. We then design a spatial branch--and--bound algorithm to find an SNE, a"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1711.06318","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}