{"paper":{"title":"Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Georgy Lukyanov, Vasilii Ivanik","submitted_at":"2025-08-29T09:14:34Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study sequential social learning when agents pay a fixed cost for private information and prefer less popular actions. Actions taken without new information leave beliefs unchanged but alter popularity and subsequent decision cutoffs, potentially restarting acquisition. In a binary-signal benchmark, we characterize the restart region and show that public log odds at information dates form a stopped random walk. Contrarian incentives initially expand this region and weakly improve terminal beliefs and action accuracy in discrete steps. After the region reaches an intrinsic information-cost f"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2508.21446","kind":"arxiv","version":7},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2508.21446/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}