{"paper":{"title":"Information-theoretic security without an honest majority","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Alain Tapp, Anne Broadbent","submitted_at":"2007-06-13T23:05:40Z","abstract_excerpt":"We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel). We give protocols for veto, vote, anonymous bit transmission, collision detection, notification and anonymous message transmission. Not assuming an honest majority, in most cases, a single corrupt participant can make the protocol abort. All protocols achieve functionality never obtained before without the use of either c"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"0706.2010","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}