{"paper":{"title":"Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Baharak Rastegari, David Manlove, Dimitrios Magos, Eva Ocel\\'akov\\'a, Ioannis Mourtos, Katar\\'ina Cechl\\'arov\\'a, Pavlos Eirinakis, Tam\\'as Fleiner","submitted_at":"2015-07-10T12:12:44Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the \\emph{Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT)} that effectively handles ties via properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using different pr"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1507.02866","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}