{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Auctions for Constrained Buyers","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Batya Berzack, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Rotem Oshman","submitted_at":"2026-06-29T18:07:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study multi-unit multi-buyer auctions, where buyers are subject to constraints that affect their bidding strategy. These may take the form of \\emph{bidding constraints} (e.g., no-overbidding, in cases where bids are partially verifiable), or of \\emph{outcome constraints} (e.g., in the case of auctions that unfold over time, an inability to go into debt even temporarily). The constraints fundamentally redefine the design space: the revelation principle, the envelope theorem, and Myerson's lemma do not apply in this constrained setting. Consequently, the space of implementable mechanisms expa"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2606.30776","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2606.30776/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}