{"paper":{"title":"Balanced Fair Division for Three Agents under General Valuations and Laminar Constraints","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Max Dupr\\'{e} la Tour","submitted_at":"2026-08-10T11:10:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study fair allocations of indivisible items under general set valuations. We prove that every instance with three agents and arbitrary real-valued valuations admits a balanced allocation that is envy-free up to one good and one chore (EF$1^c_g$). This directly implies balanced EF$1$ when each valuation is either monotone nondecreasing or monotone nonincreasing. We also show that balanced EF$1$ cannot be guaranteed without monotonicity: there exists an instance with three agents, nine items, and identical nonmonotone valuations that admits no balanced EF$1$ allocation. We then consider a com"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2608.09437","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2608.09437/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}