{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Differentially Private Model Training with Public Data","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.CR","math.OC","stat.ML"],"primary_cat":"cs.LG","authors_text":"Andrew Lowy, Meisam Razaviyayn, Tianjian Huang, Zeman Li","submitted_at":"2023-06-26T20:40:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"Differential privacy (DP) ensures that training a machine learning model does not leak private data. In practice, we may have access to auxiliary public data that is free of privacy concerns. In this work, we assume access to a given amount of public data and settle the following fundamental open questions: 1. What is the optimal (worst-case) error of a DP model trained over a private data set while having access to side public data? 2. How can we harness public data to improve DP model training in practice? We consider these questions in both the local and central models of pure and approxima"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2306.15056","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2306.15056/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}