{"paper":{"title":"The Capacity Constrained Facility Location problem","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.AI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes, Haris Aziz, Hau Chan","submitted_at":"2018-06-04T05:28:33Z","abstract_excerpt":"We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design perspective. The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer. Our focus is on mechanisms that are ex-post dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC) at the reporting stage. We provide a complete characterization of DIC mechanisms via the family of Generalized Median Mechanisms (G"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1806.00960","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}