{"paper":{"title":"Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DM"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale, Giuseppe Persiano, Vincenzo Auletta","submitted_at":"2010-02-18T10:25:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study \"logit dynamics\" [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly at random and she plays according to a \"noisy\" best-response where the noise level is tuned by a parameter $\\beta$. Such a dynamics defines a family of ergodic Markov chains, indexed by $\\beta$, over the set of strategy profiles. We believe that the stationary distribution of these Markov chains gives a meaningful description of the long-term behavior for systems whose agents are not completely rational.\n  Our aim is"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1002.3474","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}