{"paper":{"title":"Competition between private and expressed opinions in binary choice: the $\\alpha$-EPO $q$-voter model","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"The α-EPO q-voter model shows that self-anticonformity makes collective agreement robust to the probability of updating private versus expressed opinions.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","authors_text":"Arkadiusz Lipiecki, Barbara Kami\\'nska, Barbara Nowak, Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T19:07:20Z","abstract_excerpt":"People often express opinions that differ from their privately held views, a phenomenon known in economy as preference falsification. Expressed-private opinion (EPO) models capture this by assigning each agent two dynamical variables: a private (internal) and an expressed (external) opinion. Within the nonlinear $q$-voter model, two EPO variants have been studied so far: with and without self-anticonformity. In both formulations, agents update private and expressed binary opinions, one after another and at the same rate, which has led to two update schemes studied previously: AT (act then thin"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"Comparing the two model variants, we show that the collective outcome controlled by α strongly depends on self-anticonformity: with self-anticonformity the results are robust to α, whereas without it α shifts the agreement-disagreement threshold and can change the type of phase transition.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The pair approximation and mean-field derivations assume that the network is either fully connected or has a well-defined average degree k, and that higher-order correlations beyond pairs can be neglected; this may fail on real organizational networks with strong community structure.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"The α-EPO q-voter model shows that update probability α between private and expressed opinions shifts agreement thresholds and hysteresis width, with effects that depend strongly on whether self-anticonformity is present.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"The α-EPO q-voter model shows that self-anticonformity makes collective agreement robust to the probability of updating private versus expressed opinions.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"8826608b0e96d85e463dd61050b8d76eba2ac0b2a2965ef1a790c3df78d5f5df"},"source":{"id":"2601.18895","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"verdict":{"id":"c9693ce7-d00b-4619-91f1-604b7915f988","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-16T10:39:07.161180Z","strongest_claim":"Comparing the two model variants, we show that the collective outcome controlled by α strongly depends on self-anticonformity: with self-anticonformity the results are robust to α, whereas without it α shifts the agreement-disagreement threshold and can change the type of phase transition.","one_line_summary":"The α-EPO q-voter model shows that update probability α between private and expressed opinions shifts agreement thresholds and hysteresis width, with effects that depend strongly on whether self-anticonformity is present.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The pair approximation and mean-field derivations assume that the network is either fully connected or has a well-defined average degree k, and that higher-order correlations beyond pairs can be neglected; this may fail on real organizational networks with strong community structure.","pith_extraction_headline":"The α-EPO q-voter model shows that self-anticonformity makes collective agreement robust to the probability of updating private versus expressed opinions."},"references":{"count":41,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"act then think","work_id":"c4f94f8c-5b3d-406a-86db-93601b163cf5","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2000,"title":"We use two types of initial conditions: ordered,c S(0) =c σ (0) =1, and random, wherec S(0) = cσ (0) =1/2","work_id":"1a9697b3-6986-4128-91d1-80f5a2a5066d","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"Model with self-anticonformity Below we simplify the mean-field equations for the sta- tionary states for the model with self-anticonformity. c↑↑ =c σ (1−α) [1−(1−p)(1−c S)q] +c ↑↑α[1−p/2−(1−p)(1−c S)","work_id":"e5ea9aec-dca2-45d0-94ca-d32b70819dca","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2023,"title":"1−(1−p) k↑↑ +k ↑↓ !(k−q)! k↑↑ +k ↑↓ −q !k! 1k↑↑+k↑↓⩾q # , (38) f ↓↑→↓↓ (κ) =α(1−p) k↓↑ +k ↓↓ !(k−q)! k↓↑ +k ↓↓ −q !k! 1k↓↑+k↓↓⩾q + 1 2 αp,(39) f ↓↑→↑↑ (κ) = (1−α) ×","work_id":"f3757d64-eb2a-4d61-96ef-8c072a8dd09b","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":1987,"title":"Kuran, Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Col- lective Conservatism, The Economic Journal97, 642 (1987)","work_id":"f76b2631-33d5-457e-b5fc-fcc6dfcd8075","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":41,"snapshot_sha256":"32083f31f0c156a070003de8850efe00787a21aeea7a14947a5d1f4183862b91","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":2,"snapshot_sha256":"3bfa8449cce235709ec189403897b30a94be13a8a6aa8999dda98adda6295245"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}