{"paper":{"title":"Individual-based stability in hedonic games depending on the best or worst players","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Evangelia Pyrga, Haris Aziz, Paul Harrenstein","submitted_at":"2011-05-09T23:51:47Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic games) in the coalition. We show that for $\\mathcal{B}$-hedonic games, an individually stable partition is guaranteed to exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which returns a Nash stable partition (if one exists) for $\\mathcal{B}$-hedonic games with strict preferences. Both $\\mathcal{W}$- and W-hedonic ga"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1105.1824","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}