{"paper":{"title":"A Tunable Incentive Mechanism for Binary Aggregation Without Verification","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chien-Chih Chen, Wojciech Golab","submitted_at":"2026-06-29T23:19:14Z","abstract_excerpt":"Binary aggregation without verifiable ground truth arises when agents' reports must be aggregated without access to gold-standard labels. This paper studies a tunable reward--penalty mechanism for binary aggregation without verification. Agents choose between a conforming strategy, which reports an informative private signal, and a non-conforming strategy, which follows a deterministic prior-informed report rule. For this mechanism, we derive cost-adjusted sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility and individual rationality as bounds on the reward--penalty ratio. The analysis identifie"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2606.30974","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2606.30974/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}