{"paper":{"title":"Funding Games: the Truth but not the Whole Truth","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DM"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Amotz Bar-Noy, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, George Rabanca, Matthew P. Johnson, Yi Gai","submitted_at":"2011-07-12T22:59:02Z","abstract_excerpt":"We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\\em lower}-bounds $i$'s true value for receiving $x_i$ items. The pairs $(x_i, \\tilde{v}_i(x_i))$ can be thought of as size-value pairs defining a knapsack problem with capacity $m$. A publicly-known algorithm is used to solve this knapsack problem, deciding which requests to satisfy in order to maximize the social welfare.\n  We show that a simple mechanism based on the knapsac"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1107.2432","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}