{"paper":{"title":"Average-case Analysis of the Assignment Problem with Independent Preferences","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.AI","cs.MA"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Jie Zhang, Yansong Gao","submitted_at":"2019-06-01T08:29:24Z","abstract_excerpt":"The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism \\textit{Random Priority} is asymptotically the best mechanism for this purpose, when comparing its welfare to the optimal social welfare using the canonical \\textit{worst-case approximation ratio}. Despite its popularity, the efficiency loss indicated by the worst-case ratio does not have a constant bound. Recently, [Deng, Gao, Zhang 2017] show that when the agents' pre"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1906.00182","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}