{"paper":{"title":"Breaking the 4-Approximation Barrier in Strategyproof Two-Facility Location","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Bo Peng, Mengfan Ma","submitted_at":"2026-08-10T03:09:52Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study strategyproof mechanism design without transfers for the two-facility location problem in metric spaces. A mechanism selects two facility locations based on agents' reported locations; each agent incurs her distance to the nearer facility, and the objective is to minimize the expected social cost. A mechanism is strategyproof if no agent ever benefits from misreporting her location. The best approximation ratio achieved by a randomized strategyproof mechanism has been $4$, attained by the Proportional mechanism of Lu, Sun, Wang, and Zhu (EC 2010), and the best lower bound has been $1."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2608.09061","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2608.09061/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}