{"paper":{"title":"A Statistical View of Learning in the Centipede Game","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["stat.AP"],"primary_cat":"stat.ME","authors_text":"Anton H. Westveld, Peter D. Hoff","submitted_at":"2010-03-11T04:36:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a player's error in assessing the utility of decisions changes as they gain experience with the game. We first estimate parameters in a statistical model where the probabilities of choices of the players are given by a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1996, 1998), but are allowed to change with repeated play. This model gives a better f"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1003.2253","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}