{"paper":{"title":"Algorithms for Equilibria in Concurrent Stopping Games","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.MA"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"K. S. Thejaswini, L\\'eonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger","submitted_at":"2026-07-27T09:50:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"Concurrent games are a standard model for multi-agent systems, with Nash equilibrium as their central solution concept. The associated \\emph{constrained existence problem}---does a game admit a Nash equilibrium whose expected payoff lies within a prescribed interval for every player?---is undecidable, and remains so even for 10-player \\emph{stopping} games, in which a terminal state is reached almost surely under every strategy profile. We give two routes to tractability.\n  We first relax exactness and consider the problem of approximate constrained existence problem, parametrised by $\\varepsi"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2607.24219","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2607.24219/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}