{"paper":{"title":"Biprofile Deviation Logic: Report-Replacement Frames and Audit Witnesses","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"Biprofile deviation logic proves sound and complete for abstract report-replacement frames Dev(N).","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.LO","authors_text":"Baris Basaran, Faruk Alpay","submitted_at":"2026-05-04T10:56:27Z","abstract_excerpt":"Biprofile deviation logic models strategic social choice states as pairs $(R,P)$, where $R$ is the true profile used for welfare comparisons and $P$ is the submitted report profile used by the rule. Coalition modalities replace only the reports of the coalition, and their relations satisfy the fixed law $E_C \\circ E_D = E_{C \\cup D}$. The paper proves soundness and completeness of $H_{\\mathrm{bp}}$ for the abstract frame class $\\mathrm{Dev}(N)$, with the reverse-composition midpoint displayed inside the canonical proof. It then separates abstract $\\mathrm{Dev}(N)$-components from genuine repor"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"The paper proves soundness and completeness of H_bp for the abstract frame class Dev(N), with the reverse-composition midpoint displayed inside the canonical proof. It then separates abstract Dev(N)-components from genuine report-coordinate products by coordinate separation.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The coalition modalities satisfy the fixed law E_C ∘ E_D = E_{C ∪ D} for all coalitions C and D.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"Biprofile deviation logic proves soundness and completeness of H_bp for Dev(N) frames and introduces typed manipulation witnesses, boundary-row theorem, and factor-closure criterion for auditing report changes.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"Biprofile deviation logic proves sound and complete for abstract report-replacement frames Dev(N).","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"054442decc6eef24e1e82943b8b5178bbebc3ebc36e0157271b145dba8f39107"},"source":{"id":"2605.12537","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":"7a2a6cee-afe1-47c7-af0f-749454ffa738","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-14T22:06:50.851429Z","strongest_claim":"The paper proves soundness and completeness of H_bp for the abstract frame class Dev(N), with the reverse-composition midpoint displayed inside the canonical proof. It then separates abstract Dev(N)-components from genuine report-coordinate products by coordinate separation.","one_line_summary":"Biprofile deviation logic proves soundness and completeness of H_bp for Dev(N) frames and introduces typed manipulation witnesses, boundary-row theorem, and factor-closure criterion for auditing report changes.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The coalition modalities satisfy the fixed law E_C ∘ E_D = E_{C ∪ D} for all coalitions C and D.","pith_extraction_headline":"Biprofile deviation logic proves sound and complete for abstract report-replacement frames Dev(N)."},"references":{"count":28,"sample":[{"doi":"10.3390/g8040046","year":null,"title":"Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey.Games2017,8(4), 46","work_id":"cd4c832f-cb78-4643-beb5-cfd131e72efa","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.1007/978-3-540-30227-8_5","year":2004,"title":"Knowledge-Theoretic Properties of Strategic Voting","work_id":"fa450b38-3c6a-4602-9307-bb09cdd4d8a3","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2013,"title":"Strategic Voting and the Logic of Knowledge","work_id":"13a76e05-39d7-4824-9755-8bbc7f7c976e","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.1007/s10992-011-","year":null,"title":"Reasoning about Social Choice Functions","work_id":"2ccad3e0-dd63-4b7a-afad-57504780265d","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.1007/s10458-016-9328-6","year":null,"title":"Proving Classical Theorems of Social Choice Theory in Modal Logic.Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems2016,30(5), 963–989","work_id":"c1227689-c1ca-4450-96fe-4ee1107b758e","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":28,"snapshot_sha256":"d5fde69c867091085881347af05bd2d3486994fbb8d39fa974db1be7eb5199a9","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}