{"paper":{"title":"A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","math.PR"],"primary_cat":"math.CO","authors_text":"Elchanan Mossel, Miklos Z. Racz","submitted_at":"2011-10-26T19:29:12Z","abstract_excerpt":"Recently, quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem were proven for $k=3$ alternatives by Friedgut, Kalai, Keller and Nisan and for neutral functions on $k \\geq 4$ alternatives by Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel.\n  We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for general social choice functions for any number $k \\geq 3$ of alternatives. In particular we show that for a social choice function $f$ on $k \\geq 3$ alternatives and $n$ voters, which is $\\epsilon$-far from the family of nonmanipulable functions, a uniformly chosen voter profile is manipulable wit"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1110.5888","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}