{"paper":{"title":"Smart Jammer and LTE Network Strategies in An Infinite-Horizon Zero-Sum Repeated Game with Asymmetric and Incomplete Information","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.SY","eess.SP"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Farhan M. Aziz, Gordon L. Stuber, Jeff S. Shamma, Lichun Li","submitted_at":"2019-04-25T07:34:56Z","abstract_excerpt":"LTE/LTE-Advanced networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service and loss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. In this article, the interaction between a smart jammer and LTE network is modeled as an infinite-horizon, zero-sum, asymmetric repeated game. The smart jammer and eNode B are modeled as the informed and the uninformed player, respectively. The main purpose of this article is to construct efficient suboptimal strategies for both players that can be used to solve the above-mentioned infinite-horizon repeated game with asymmetric and incomplete information. It has been shown "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1904.11184","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}