{"paper":{"title":"Spatial Evolutionary Games with small selection coefficients","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["q-bio.PE"],"primary_cat":"math.PR","authors_text":"Rick Durrett","submitted_at":"2014-06-23T11:55:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on $Z^d$, $d\\ge 3$ when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix $\\sigma^2I$. The games we consider have payoff matrices of the form ${\\bf 1} + wG$ where ${\\bf 1}$ is matrix of all 1's and $w$ is small and positive. Since our population size $N=\\infty$, we call our selection small rather than weak which usually means $w =O(1/N)$.\n  The key to studying these games is the fact that when the dynamics are suitably rescaled in space and time the"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1406.5876","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}