{"paper":{"title":"Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.CC"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Aviad Rubinstein, Yakov Babichenko","submitted_at":"2016-08-23T17:07:52Z","abstract_excerpt":"For a constant $\\epsilon$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $\\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of $(\\epsilon,\\epsilon)$-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least $(1-\\epsilon)$-fraction of the players are $\\epsilon$-best replying."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1608.06580","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}