{"paper":{"title":"Efficiency Adjustments Break the Logarithmic Rank Barrier","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Gabriel Ziegler, Geng Zhao, Josue Ortega","submitted_at":"2026-08-05T13:44:11Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the expected average rank achieved by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism in i.i.d.\\ matching markets. While student-proposing Deferred Acceptance gives students an expected average rank of logarithmic order, we prove that EADA's expected average rank is at most $4\\log\\log n+O(1)$. Therefore, EADA improves the asymptotic order of students' assignments.\n  At the cost of a weaker bound, $O((\\log\\log n)^2)$, we extend this conclusion to a much larger class of mechanisms. Namely, every Pareto-efficient mechanism that weakly Pareto-dominates DA breaks DA's logarith"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2608.09984","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2608.09984/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}