{"paper":{"title":"A Probabilistic Analysis on a Lattice Attack against DSA","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.NT"],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Domingo Gomez-Perez, Gu\\'ena\\\"el Renault","submitted_at":"2017-12-28T11:33:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"Analyzing the security of cryptosystems under attacks based on the malicious modification of memory registers is a research topic of high importance. This type of attacks may affect the randomness of the secret parameters by forcing a limited number of bits to a certain value which can be unknown to the attacker. In this context, we revisit the attack on DSA presented by Faug\\`ere, Goyet and Renault during the conference SAC 2012: we simplify their method and we provide a probabilistic approach in opposition to the heuristic proposed in the former to measure the limits of the attack. More prec"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1712.09829","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}