{"paper":{"title":"New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in General Scoring Rules","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.DS","authors_text":"Avinatan Hassidim, Noam Hazon, Orgad Keller","submitted_at":"2017-08-16T12:47:19Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted settings. We focus on minimizing the maximum score obtainable by a non-preferred candidate.\n  In the strongest, most general setting, we provide an algorithm for any scoring rule as described by a vector $\\vec{\\alpha}=(\\alpha_1,\\ldots,\\alpha_m)$: for some $\\beta=O(\\sqrt{m\\log m})$, it obtains an additive approximation equal to $W\\cdot \\max_i \\lvert \\alpha_{i+\\beta"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1708.04862","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}