{"paper":{"title":"Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg","submitted_at":"2014-05-23T00:42:09Z","abstract_excerpt":"We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\\min\\{m-k+1, \\tilde{O}(\\sqrt{k})\\}$ respectively, matching the approximation ratios of best known polynomial-time \\emph{algorithms} (for max-min fairness, the latter claim is true for certain ratios of the number of goods $m$ to people $k$). Our mechanisms are obtained by establishing a polynomial-time approximation-sensitive reduction from the problem of designing approximately "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1405.5940","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}