{"paper":{"title":"Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with three strategies","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.CA","physics.bio-ph"],"primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","authors_text":"Armando G. M. Neves, Irene N\\'u\\~nez Rodr\\'iguez","submitted_at":"2015-09-03T19:22:36Z","abstract_excerpt":"We will study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals using the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which always defect), ATFT (almost tit-for-tat: individuals which almost always repeat the opponent's last move) and G (generous individuals, which always cooperate when the opponent cooperated in the last move and have a positive probability $q$ of cooperating when they are defected). Our aim is studying in a mathematically rigorous fashion the dynamics of a simpl"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1509.01225","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}