{"paper":{"title":"Asymmetric Perturbation in Solving Bilinear Saddle-Point Optimization","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"math.OC","authors_text":"Atsushi Iwasaki, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe, Mitsuki Sakamoto","submitted_at":"2025-06-06T05:18:28Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper proposes asymmetric perturbation, where only one player's payoff function is perturbed, for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Symmetric perturbation is known to require decreasing its strength to ensure convergence to a solution, i.e., an equilibrium in the original game, resulting in a slower rate. First, with asymmetric perturbation, we show that, for a sufficiently small perturbation strength, the equilibrium strategy of the asymmetrically perturbed game coincides with an equilibri"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2506.05747","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2506.05747/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}