{"paper":{"title":"A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: Equilibria simulated by an agent-based model","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"math.PR","authors_text":"Emiko Fukuda, Hiroyuki Masuyama, Yutaka Sakuma","submitted_at":"2019-06-18T01:10:15Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper considers a discrete-time single-server queue with a single acceptance period for a Poissonian population of homogeneous customers. Customers are served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis, and their service times are independent and identically distributed with a general distribution. We assume that each customer chooses her/his arrival-time slot with the goal of minimizing her/his expected waiting time in competition with other customers. For this queueing game, we derive a symmetric (mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium; that is, an equilibrium arrival-time distribution of homo"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1906.07326","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}