{"paper":{"title":"Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Nick Gravin, Ning Chen, Pinyan Lu, Xiaohui Bei","submitted_at":"2011-07-15T06:16:48Z","abstract_excerpt":"Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget feasible mechanisms that admit `small' approximations (compared to a socially optimal solution). Singer \\cite{PS10} showed that additive and submodular functions admit a constant approximation mechanism. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer \\cite{DPS11} gave an $O(\\log^2n)$ approximation mechanism for subadditive functions and remarked that: \"A fu"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1107.2994","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}