{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah","submitted_at":"2017-04-17T16:37:32Z","abstract_excerpt":"In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for $n$ units of the item is $v \\min \\{ n, d\\} $, where the per unit valuation $v$ and the capacity $d$ are private information of the buyer. We consider this problem in the Bayesian setting, where the pair $(v,d)$ is drawn jointly from a given probability distribution. In the \\emph{unlimited supply} setting, the optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism is a pricing problem, i.e., it is a menu of lotteries. In this paper we show that under a natural regularity condition on the probability distrib"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1704.05027","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}