{"paper":{"title":"A TEE-Based Architecture for Confidential and Dependable Process Attestation in Authorship Verification","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"A TEE architecture collects continuous process attestation evidence with hardware tamper resistance against adversarial platform owners.","cross_cats":["cs.AR","cs.OS"],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"David Condrey","submitted_at":"2026-02-26T20:17:52Z","abstract_excerpt":"Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We pr"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3).","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"First TEE-based architecture for continuous process attestation with hardware tamper resistance, tiered assurance levels, Markov-chain dependability modeling, and resilient protocol achieving over 99.5% evidence chain availability.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"A TEE architecture collects continuous process attestation evidence with hardware tamper resistance against adversarial platform owners.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"c7c5bf4ee0d9dd27fba7eba7ba8f303e5d083335b84a21445864b9999f990e3c"},"source":{"id":"2603.00178","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":"ecdb3b78-e132-42fc-9931-81f6ef8c12d4","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-15T18:28:04.380216Z","strongest_claim":"We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3).","one_line_summary":"First TEE-based architecture for continuous process attestation with hardware tamper resistance, tiered assurance levels, Markov-chain dependability modeling, and resilient protocol achieving over 99.5% evidence chain availability.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation.","pith_extraction_headline":"A TEE architecture collects continuous process attestation evidence with hardware tamper resistance against adversarial platform owners."},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2603.00178/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":2,"snapshot_sha256":"d176a3ace8c39fd641cfd80b96f43b1526b347205ab56f6b05212d6b570b693d"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}