{"paper":{"title":"Between Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite; A representation theoretic approach","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.CC","cs.DM","cs.GT","math.RT"],"primary_cat":"math.CO","authors_text":"Dvir Falik, Ehud Friedgut","submitted_at":"2012-03-14T11:11:36Z","abstract_excerpt":"A central theme in social choice theory is that of impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In recent years, beginning in Kalai`01, much work has been done in finding \\textit{robust} versions of these theorems, showing \"approximate\" impossibility remains even when most, but not all, of the constraints are satisfied. We study a spectrum of settings between the case where society chooses a single outcome (\\'a-la-Gibbard-Satterthwaite) and the cho"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1203.3368","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}