{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Data Attacks on Power Grids: Leveraging Detection & Measurement Jamming","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.OC"],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Deepjyoti Deka, Ross Baldick, Sriram Vishwanath","submitted_at":"2015-06-15T10:23:44Z","abstract_excerpt":"Meter measurements in the power grid are susceptible to manipulation by adversaries, that can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a general framework to study attacks on state estimation by adversaries capable of injecting bad-data into measurements and further, of jamming their reception. Through these two techniques, a novel `detectable jamming' attack is designed that changes the state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. Compared to commonly studied `hidden' data attacks, these attacks have lower costs and a wider feasible operating region. It is shown "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1506.04541","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}