{"paper":{"title":"Continuous-time mean field games: a primal-dual characterization","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.PR"],"primary_cat":"math.OC","authors_text":"Anran Hu, Jiacheng Zhang, Xin Guo, Yufei Zhang","submitted_at":"2025-03-02T22:24:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper establishes a primal-dual formulation for continuous-time mean field games (MFGs) and provides a complete analytical characterization of the set of all Nash equilibria (NEs). We first show that for any given mean field flow, the representative player's control problem with {\\it measurable coefficients} is equivalent to a linear program over the space of occupation measures. We then establish the dual formulation of this linear program as a maximization problem over smooth subsolutions of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which plays a fundamental role in charact"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2503.01042","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2503.01042/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}