{"paper":{"title":"Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein, Tomer Ezra","submitted_at":"2026-08-11T18:56:55Z","abstract_excerpt":"We introduce the study of \\emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves $k$ agents and can be executed only if all $k$ agents agree to participate. The classical case $k=2$ is the well-studied bilateral trade problem, where a seller and a buyer with private values must decide whether to trade an item initially held by the seller. Existing extensions of bilateral trade have largely focused on markets with many buyers and many sellers, but where each realized transaction is still bilateral, requiring agreement only between the matched buyer and "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2608.11351","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2608.11351/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}