{"paper":{"title":"A Practical Trojan Horse for Bell-inequality-based Quantum Cryptography","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Jan-{\\AA}ke Larsson","submitted_at":"2001-11-13T18:19:20Z","abstract_excerpt":"Quantum Cryptography, or more accurately, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is based on using an unconditionally secure ``quantum channel'' to share a secret key among two users. A manufacturer of QKD devices could, intentionally or not, use a (semi-)classical channel instead of the quantum channel, which would remove the supposedly unconditional security. One example is the BB84 protocol, where the quantum channel can be implemented in polarization of single photons. Here, use of several photons instead of one to encode each bit of the key provides a similar but insecure system. For protocols ba"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"quant-ph/0111073","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/quant-ph/0111073/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}