{"paper":{"title":"Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Michal Feldman","submitted_at":"2018-06-11T08:58:40Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to $n$ potential agents with {\\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a known function of all $n$ private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for artwork, oil drilling rights, broadcast rights, and many more.\n  In the interdependent value setting, all previous work has assumed a so-called {\\sl single-crossing condition}. Single-crossing means that the impact of agent $i$'s private signal, $s_i$, on her own valuation is greater than the impact of $s"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1806.03865","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}