{"paper":{"title":"Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"In Stackelberg Gaussian signaling with linear sensitivity mismatch, the encoder transmits information only along the negative-eigenvalue directions of the mismatch matrix in the noiseless case.","cross_cats":["cs.IT","cs.SY","eess.SY","math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Hassan Munif, Samson Lasaulce, Vineeth Satheeskumar Varma","submitted_at":"2026-02-22T17:59:27Z","abstract_excerpt":"We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regim"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The analysis assumes a linear sensitivity mismatch between encoder and decoder preferences together with jointly Gaussian state and noise; if the mismatch is nonlinear or the distributions are non-Gaussian the derived spectral and threshold characterizations need not hold.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"In Stackelberg Gaussian signaling with linear sensitivity mismatch, equilibria feature transmission only along negative-eigenvalue eigenspaces in noiseless cases and collapse if mismatch or transmission cost exceeds channel-dependent thresholds in noisy cases.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"In Stackelberg Gaussian signaling with linear sensitivity mismatch, the encoder transmits information only along the negative-eigenvalue directions of the mismatch matrix in the noiseless case.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"84f0096e777695d8f30b54d1bb2cff61b7a12807004ae8909487f7de25a0d5b1"},"source":{"id":"2602.19292","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":"004ec7c3-cb1e-4a1c-8a80-f315fe6d8323","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-15T20:38:56.638233Z","strongest_claim":"In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold.","one_line_summary":"In Stackelberg Gaussian signaling with linear sensitivity mismatch, equilibria feature transmission only along negative-eigenvalue eigenspaces in noiseless cases and collapse if mismatch or transmission cost exceeds channel-dependent thresholds in noisy cases.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The analysis assumes a linear sensitivity mismatch between encoder and decoder preferences together with jointly Gaussian state and noise; if the mismatch is nonlinear or the distributions are non-Gaussian the derived spectral and threshold characterizations need not hold.","pith_extraction_headline":"In Stackelberg Gaussian signaling with linear sensitivity mismatch, the encoder transmits information only along the negative-eigenvalue directions of the mismatch matrix in the noiseless case."},"references":{"count":17,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":2015,"title":"Akyol, E., Langbort, C., and Ba¸ sar, T. (2015). Privacy constrained information processing. InProc. 54th IEEE Conf. Decis. Control (CDC), 4511–4516","work_id":"9ff2da24-8882-4162-a4f2-555c0bae200f","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2017,"title":"Akyol, E., Langbort, C., and Ba¸ sar, T. (2017). Information-theoretic approach to strategic communica- tion as a hierarchical game.Proc. IEEE, 105, 205–218","work_id":"4ff41a97-ca5e-48ef-b32c-fc8f71dda35e","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":1999,"title":"Cover, T.M. and Thomas, J.A. (1999).Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley & Sons","work_id":"eb8f48a1-4c64-41f0-acb3-4018b267de6d","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":1982,"title":"Crawford, V.P. and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission.Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–1451","work_id":"02b51341-e398-415f-b75f-cbbd171aa1a4","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":2017,"title":"Farokhi, F., Teixeira, A.M.H., and Langbort, C. (2017). Estimation with strategic sensors.IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, 62(2), 724–739","work_id":"4c7b30d0-0cd2-4007-82ca-0b93fc8e4a67","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":17,"snapshot_sha256":"4c48e709953270600aa1bb8d6a11ca282b2cb987e9f86f511e7975accd496fd9","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":1,"snapshot_sha256":"b4d25fceca5b2f145451120e8286b7420aaed5bdd9a5a2ae0c6508d4cf0af2b0"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"}