{"arxiv_id":"2611.17084","title":"Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games","abstract":"In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.","primary_cat":"cs.LO","cross_cats":[],"submitted_at":"2026-11-12T16:50:15+00:00","latest_version":1,"source":"arxiv","source_label":"arXiv","source_url":null,"has_pdf":true,"has_source":false,"verdict":"CONDITIONAL","confidence":"HIGH","one_line_summary":"In a binary two-player game where one player always chooses the move with the highest worst-case payoff, revealing the mover's moves along a chosen path makes that path the play, needing at most one disclosure per mover decision.","novelty_score":4.0,"correctness_risk":"medium","formal_verification":"none","upvotes":0,"downvotes":0,"pith_score":0,"inbound_count":0,"_links":{"html":"https://pith.science/paper/2611.17084","verdict":"/api/v1/verdicts/2611.17084"}}