{"id":"959f355f-3e41-4f0c-8980-1ce93d7f60cc","arxiv_id":"2501.11794","paper_version":2,"verdict":"REJECT","confidence":"MODERATE","novelty_score":4.0,"correctness_risk":"high","formal_verification":"none","parameter_count":4,"one_line_summary":"SPID-Chain combines Polar-coded distributed computation with an IOTA-style DAG to validate cross-chain transfers; the simulations claim gains, but the abstract's promised analytical results are absent from the text.","lead":"SPID-Chain is a proposed cross-chain settlement design that validates token transfers with Polar-coded computation on a DAG ledger, and its simulations claim higher throughput and straggler resilience than uncoded validation. The abstract promises exact mathematical bounds and a stability theorem, but the body text contains only the design and simulations, none of the promised derivations.","discovery_kind":"new_application","skeptic_critique":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash","headline":"The abstract promises five analytical results and an end-to-end settlement guarantee; Sections 2–6 contain no theorem statements or proofs, and the sole quantitative stability input (μcrit=(K-1)/K, §5.1) is imported from IOTA Coordicide [57] without derivation for SPID-Chain's weighted-AW DAG.","rationale":"The reader's weakest assumption and rationale both point at real problems, but I weight them slightly differently. The μcrit import is the sharpest testable instance, yet the more fundamental load-bearing issue is that the abstract advertises a body of exact analysis that the manuscript never states. Even a correct import of [57] would not supply the recovery-time distribution, Byzantine soundness bound, weighted-quorum condition, or end-to-end guarantee. The balance arithmetic (Eqs. 1–3) is self-consistent, and the §5.1 setup is commendably concrete (Substrate, GoShimmer, BigQuery data, VRF via libsodium), but neither compensates for the absent derivations. The lack of a released harness and of error bars further limits verification but is secondary. Because the abstract's central claims cannot be checked against the manuscript, the REJECT verdict stands; CONDITIONAL would fit only if the derivations were present but flawed. My proposed re-derivation of the stability threshold for the §2.2.2 weighted-AW process would settle whether the one quantitative prediction in the body survives, but even a positive outcome there would leave four of the five advertised results unaccounted for.","tokens_in":27246,"tokens_out":12081,"duration_ms":107851,"concrete_test":"Independently re-derive the tip-pool stability threshold for SPID-Chain's own process: N chains each releasing one block per epoch, each block referencing K randomly chosen tips, and confirmation requiring stake-weighted AW ≥ η=67% (§2.2.2). If the stable/unstable condition on the adversarial share μ is not exactly μcrit=(K-1)/K, or if it depends on η and the stake weights {ω_j}, then Fig. 7's predicted transition and the §5.2.3 conclusions do not follow, and the promised cross-layer stability theorem must be re-derived rather than imported from [57].","verdict_should_be":"UNCHANGED","load_bearing_attack":"The central claim — that SPID-Chain is a 'verifiable and analytically grounded' settlement layer with an 'end-to-end settlement guarantee' — requires the five results announced in the abstract: an exact recovery-time distribution, a Byzantine verification-soundness bound, an exact weighted-quorum condition, a cross-layer stability theorem, and the end-to-end guarantee itself. The body provides none of them. Its own title ('A Smart Contract-Enabled, Polar-Coded Interoperable DAG Chain') and Sections 2–6 describe a design-and-simulation system: architecture and EDSC (Sections 2–3), balance arithmetic (Eqs. 1–3) plus a Hadamard-transform coded update (Eqs. 5–10) without any recovery-time distribution or Byzantine bound (Section 4), and simulations (Section 5). The single quantitative analytical claim is §5.1's assertion that μcrit=(K-1)/K, 'as demonstrated in [57] for the IOTA-type DAG ledger.' That transfer is not argued: SPID-Chain issues exactly one block per chain per epoch, selects K random tips as parents, and confirms by stake-weighted aggregated weight at η=67% (§2.2.2), whereas [57] analyzes a continuous-time tip-selection DAG under different confirmation semantics. If the threshold does not transfer, the advertised 'predicted transition between stable and unstable DAG operation' and the §5.2.3 security discussion (tip-pool blowup at μ>μcrit, Fig. 7) are unsupported. The balance checks and the detailed §5.1 setup are genuine positives, but they do not supply the missing analysis.","agreement_with_reader":"partial"},"referee_report":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash","summary":"The manuscript, posted as 'SPID-Chain: Verifiable Polar-Coded State Validation for Cross-Chain DAG Settlement' but carrying the in-text title 'SPID-Chain: A Smart Contract-Enabled, Polar-Coded Interoperable DAG Chain,' proposes a cross-chain settlement architecture in which each blockchain runs an event-driven smart-contract (EDSC) pipeline with a committee/worker node split and Polar-coded distributed computation, while the chains jointly maintain a weighted DAG ledger on which blocks are confirmed by aggregated weight. Section 4 develops balance-checking arithmetic (Eqs. (1)-(3)), a zero-padded Hadamard/Polar encoding (Eqs. (5)-(10)), and a six-contract stage protocol (Section 4.4); Section 5 reports prototype-assisted simulations of intra- and inter-consensus throughput, scalability, Gini-based decentralization, tip-pool growth and finality, and double-spend detection. The posted abstract advertises derivations of an exact recovery-time distribution, a Byzantine verification-soundness bound, an exact weighted-quorum condition, a cross-layer stability theorem, and an end-to-end settlement guarantee, but the body contains no theorem statements, proofs, or derivations beyond the bookkeeping equations and the imported threshold μcrit=(K-1)/K.","tokens_in":27526,"tokens_out":19981,"duration_ms":187902,"significance":"Were the advertised analytical results present, the contribution would be substantial: quantitative coupling of straggler-resilient coded verification to weighted-DAG confirmation stability, plus provable settlement invariants across heterogeneous chains without native-consensus changes. The manuscript's genuine strengths are the detailed architectural narrative (Sections 2-4), the coherent cumulative in/out-flow bookkeeping of Section 4.1 (Eq. (3) is a sensible per-account sufficiency check that avoids double-counting confirmed versus proposed spending), the explicit simulation stack and parameters (Substrate, GoShimmer, Rust bridge, libsodium VRF, BigQuery Ethereum data, 10-run averages), and the honest in-paper contribution list, which claims only architecture, mechanisms, and simulations. However, the analytical backbone advertised in the posted abstract is absent; the sole stability input (Section 5.1) is imported from IOTA Coordicide without adapting it to SPID-Chain's issuance and weighted-confirmation model; and the stability 'prediction' of Fig. 7 therefore cannot be confirmed by simulating a protocol that embeds that very threshold.","major_comments":[{"comment":"The posted abstract advertises five analytical deliverables — an exact recovery-time distribution, a Byzantine verification-soundness bound, an exact weighted-quorum condition, a cross-layer stability theorem, and an end-to-end settlement guarantee covering six properties — but the body contains no theorem statements, lemmas, or proofs, and no closed-form derivations other than the bookkeeping equations (1)-(3), the Hadamard transform (5)-(10), the Gini statistic (11), and the imported threshold of Section 5.1. The paper's own contribution list (Section 1.2) claims only architecture, mechanisms, and simulations, so the posted abstract misrepresents the manuscript. This is load-bearing because the advertised value proposition — a 'verifiable and analytically grounded settlement layer' with an 'end-to-end settlement guarantee' — is exactly what the body does not provide; terms in the posted abstract such as 'hidden linear verification checks,' 'source-chain finality establishes an immutable reservation,' and 'finite expected lock-to-release latency' have no counterpart in Sections 2-6. Either the missing analyses must be added or the abstract must be rewritten to describe a design-and-simulation paper.","section":"Abstract; Sections 1-6"},{"comment":"The stability prediction rests entirely on the imported threshold μcrit = (K-1)/K, stated as 'demonstrated in [57] for the IOTA-type DAG ledger.' No argument is given that the Coordicide tip-pool analysis transfers to SPID-Chain's model: one block per chain per epoch, K tips selected subject to at most one block per chain (Remark 3, Section 4.1), validation via coded checks, and confirmation by stake-weighted aggregated weight at η = 67%. Since an honest block validates a subset of its K selected tips and attaches only to the valid subset, the tip-removal rate per honest block is not obviously K, and the interaction between the AW confirmation rule and tip-pool dynamics is unexamined. The stress-test concern is therefore well-founded: without a derivation tailored to this weighted-AW DAG (or an explicit statement of the regime in which [57] applies), the 'predicted transition between stable and unstable DAG operation' and the Section 5.2.3 security discussion are assertions, not results; simulating the protocol that embeds the imported threshold cannot independently confirm it.","section":"Section 5.1; Fig. 7; Section 5.2.3"},{"comment":"The straggler-resilience claim of Remark 5 is not supported by the decodability analysis that would be needed to derive the promised 'exact recovery-time distribution for heterogeneous coded workers.' In the zero-padded Hadamard construction, the data occupy the non-straggler row-blocks of  and the committee must recover them from the responses of exactly the n(1-λ) non-straggler workers; this requires the principal submatrix of the Hadamard transform on the non-straggler index set to be invertible. That condition is not guaranteed for arbitrary straggler sets: already for n = 4, taking the data at indices {2,3} yields dependent output rows for the H_4 transform, so decoding fails even though the number of responding workers equals the code rate. The paper cites [48,49] for the recursive decoding algorithm but supplies neither a rank condition nor a straggler model under which decoding succeeds with rate R = 1-λ. Consequently the recovery-time distribution advertised in the abstract cannot be derived from the text as it stands, and the throughput and latency benefits claimed in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.2 lack the theoretical grounding that the abstract promises.","section":"Section 4.2, Eqs. (5)-(10)"},{"comment":"The double-spend evaluation measures whether the protocol's own Stage-2 exclusion and Stage-3 labeling mechanism identifies the injected duplicate transactions, rather than whether settlement safety (the abstract's 'conflict exclusion') holds under an adversarial confirmation strategy. No adversary model is analyzed for the case where conflicting blocks race toward the confirmation threshold η, P_d and P_fa are reported for a single configuration without sensitivity analysis, and the conclusion that 'SPID-Chain effectively resisted the attacks' at μ = 55% > μcrit is an observation about the prototype, not a soundness statement. Combined with the absence of any formal definition of conflict exclusion, replay protection, or coded-state consistency in Sections 2-4, this leaves the security component of the advertised end-to-end guarantee without evidentiary or analytical support; the side event ledger D_j introduced in Section 4.4 is never used in an argument that connects recorded events to settlement safety.","section":"Section 5.2.3; Section 4.4"}],"minor_comments":[{"comment":"The in-text title and abstract ('A Smart Contract-Enabled, Polar-Coded Interoperable DAG Chain') differ from the arXiv metadata title and abstract; the authors should ensure the posted abstract describes the same paper as the body.","section":"Title/Abstract"},{"comment":"Section 4.2.1 defines the straggler set S as the λn workers with the highest straggler probabilities, while Section 5.1 randomly selects stragglers per simulation run; since the zero-padding in Eq. (5) requires knowing S at encoding time, the encoder's information about the straggler set should be stated unambiguously.","section":"Section 4.2.1; Section 5.1"},{"comment":"References [52] and [53] are cited for Docker and GoShimmer nodes, respectively, but [52] points to 'Goshimmer Docker network tools' and [53] to 'Goshimmer Orphanage'; additionally, 'Susy [36]' in Section 1.1 should cite [37].","section":"References"},{"comment":"Typos and spacing errors should be corrected, including 'Coded Verfication' (Section 4.2 heading), 'eventpublished' (Section 4.3.1), 'detailes' (Section 4.2.2), and 'Table. 1' and 'Table. 3'.","section":"Throughout"},{"comment":"The simulation duration is inconsistent: Section 5.1 states each simulation runs for 5 minutes with 500 blocks at γ = 100 blocks/min, while Section 5.2.3 reports 12-minute runs and a 400-block test set; these numbers should be reconciled.","section":"Section 5.1; Section 5.2.3"},{"comment":"The confirmation threshold η = 67% is introduced in the results sections without justification or sensitivity analysis, and Section 5.2.1's definition of a processed block mixes intra-consensus ('blocks correctly generated') with inter-consensus (AW exceeding 67%) notions; the throughput metrics should be defined precisely.","section":"Section 5.2.1; Section 5.2.3"},{"comment":"The panels in each row of Fig. 7 are not individually labeled; the caption should state which row corresponds to K = 2 and which to K = 4, and what the filled and open markers denote.","section":"Fig. 7"}],"recommendation":"reject","confidential_remarks":"The reader's rejection is, on my reading, correct. The more serious issue is submission integrity: the manuscript body is an architecture-and-simulation paper, while the version of the abstract posted with the submission advertises five theorems and an end-to-end guarantee that do not exist in the text. That is not a fixable local defect; inviting a revision would mean either asking for a fundamentally different (much weaker) abstract or commissioning a new theory program. I would also note the careless reference assembly (the Docker and GoShimmer citations, and the duplicate citation of [36]) as a quality signal for the editor."},"author_rebuttal":null,"desk_editor":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash","letter":"Quick take: this is a design-and-simulation paper wearing an analytical abstract. The architecture itself is a legitimate new assembly — polar-coded worker computation for balance validation, event-driven smart contracts inside each chain, and an IOTA-style weighted DAG for inter-chain settlement, with a committee/worker bifurcation. That combination is not in the cited literature, and the balance arithmetic (Eqs. 1–3) is coherent, if bookkeeping. The simulation setup is unusually concrete: Substrate chains, GoShimmer DAG nodes, a custom Rust bridge, BigQuery Ethereum transactions, VRF committee selection, Gini-coefficient decentralization, and double-spend injection. For a systems paper, that is real work.\n\nBut the abstract advertises an exact recovery-time distribution, a Byzantine verification-soundness bound, an exact weighted-quorum condition, a cross-layer stability theorem, and an end-to-end settlement guarantee. None of these appears in Sections 2–6. There are no theorem statements, no proofs, no stated liveness assumptions with mathematical conditions. The only quantitative stability input, μcrit=(K−1)/K, is taken from an IOTA Coordicide analysis with no argument that the threshold transfers to SPID-Chain's single-block-per-chain-per-epoch, weighted-AW confirmation at η=67%. Fig. 7 then reports the \"predicted\" transition at that imported threshold, which is more a check of the simulator against a prior model than a validation of SPID-Chain's own model. The paper also ships no code, no data, and no error bars; 10-run averages are reported as lines.\n\nThe two readings of the paper both undersell the stated contribution. Taken at the body's word, it is a plausible systems design with preliminary simulations, but the simulations are not independently reproducible. Taken at the abstract's word, the central load-bearing claims are missing entirely. Either way, the current manuscript is not ready for review as a theory paper, and it lacks the reproducibility needed to be a strong systems paper. If the authors supply the missing derivations or remove the analytical claims and release code and data, the design merits another look. As is, I would not send this to a serious referee; I would desk-reject with an invitation to resubmit after the advertised results either appear or are retracted from the abstract.","headline":"A competent design-and-simulation paper whose abstract promises five analytical results the body never actually derives.","tokens_in":28171,"tokens_out":2155,"would_cite":false,"duration_ms":22889,"reading_group":"maybe","serious_thinker":"yes","would_accept_peer_review":false},"rs_alignment":null,"lean_confirmation":null,"pith_extraction":{"msc":[],"pacs":[],"model":"deepseek-v4-flash","headline":"SPID-Chain proposes a cross-chain settlement layer that uses Polar-coded validation and a weighted DAG to settle escrowed transfers without changing native consensus.","keywords":["cross-chain settlement","blockchain interoperability","DAG ledger","Polar codes","coded distributed computing","straggler mitigation","weighted quorum","IOTA Coordicide"],"falsifier":"Inspect the full text for the promised theorems: if Sections 2 through 6 contain no statement of the exact recovery-time distribution, the verification-soundness bound, the weighted-quorum condition, or the stability theorem, then the analytic claims are not established. Separately, run the simulation with weighted-AW confirmation at $\\eta=67\\%$ and measure tip-pool size for $\\mu$ just below and above $(K-1)/K$: the predicted transition should occur exactly at that threshold for the claim to hold.","tokens_in":1810,"feed_emoji":"🔗","tokens_out":4773,"duration_ms":107967,"temperature":0.7,"pith_summary":"SPID-Chain is a proposed settlement layer for escrow-backed transfers across heterogeneous blockchains. Its thesis is that cross-chain settlement can be made verifiable without touching native consensus: source-chain finality creates an immutable reservation, and confirmation on a stake-weighted DAG of blocks decides when the destination credit becomes executable. To keep slow validation workers from delaying settlement, the design stores settlement state as Polar-coded fragments and reconstructs it from whichever workers respond first. The abstract claims exact analytic results—a recovery-time distribution, a verification-soundness bound, an exact weighted-quorum condition, and a cross-layer stability theorem—together with an end-to-end settlement guarantee, and the body develops the architecture, balance-checking rule, and simulations intended to support those claims.","feed_headline":"Coded validation lets cross-chain settlement skip slow workers","feed_subtitle":"Weighted-DAG confirmation decides when destination credits become spendable, so native chains never change.","key_machinery":"The load-bearing mechanism is the combination of a stake-weighted DAG with aggregated-weight (AW) confirmation and Polar-coded distributed computation. The AW of a block is the sum of the stake weights of the block's issuer and every block that directly or indirectly validates it; a proposed block becomes confirmed when its AW crosses $\\eta$, which is the protocol's quorum rule. Parallel to that, the payment-validation computation is coded by expanding each chain's token-flow matrices, zeroing the rows assigned to the $\\lambda n$ slowest workers, and applying a Hadamard transform; workers accumulate coded sums across epochs, and committee nodes decode the true inflow and outflow matrices from the first decodable subset of responses, which is what removes the straggler bottleneck. The paper also relies on the critical spamming rate $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$ as the threshold where the DAG's tip pool becomes unstable.","core_discovery":"On the paper's own terms, the discovery is that coded validation and weighted-DAG confirmation can be coupled into a single settlement protocol with a stability transition. Each chain encodes its input, inflow, and outflow matrices with a Hadamard-based Polar code, workers maintain coded running sums, and committee nodes decode as soon as enough fast workers respond, so the slowest worker no longer sets the latency. A block is confirmed when its aggregated weight—the issuing chain's stake weight plus the weights of all blocks in its future cone—exceeds the threshold $\\eta$. The critical spamming rate $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$, imported from the IOTA Coordicide analysis, is said to govern whether the tip pool stays small or explodes, and simulations show the predicted transition, with larger $K$ and coded validation improving finality time and decentralization under adversarial issuance. The paper further claims that this construction yields an end-to-end guarantee covering balance non-negativity, asset conservation, conflict exclusion, replay protection, coded-state consistency, and finite expected lock-to-release latency.","pith_inferences":["The analytic results advertised in the abstract—exact recovery-time distribution, verification-soundness bound, exact weighted-quorum condition, and stability theorem—do not appear as theorems or proofs in Sections 2 through 6, so a reader should treat them as claims to be established rather than demonstrated results.","The stability transition shown in the simulations is evidence only to the extent that the Coordicide tip-pool model, designed for a particular issuance and confirmation process, carries over to SPID-Chain's stake-weighted AW confirmation at $\\eta=67\\%$.","A natural test that the paper leaves implicit is to measure the empirical tip-pool size at $\\mu$ slightly below and above $(K-1)/K$ under weighted-AW confirmation, and to compare the finality-time distribution against the promised exact recovery-time distribution.","The Hadamard-based encoding described is a linear code over row-blocks; whether it displays polar-code error behavior at finite $n$ depends on the decoding algorithm, so the consistency claims at large block lengths rest on the cited coding-theoretic results."],"forward_implications":["If the design works as claimed, a source transfer can be reserved by source-chain finality while the destination credit waits only for DAG confirmation, so native consensus need not change.","Coded validation should keep throughput from collapsing as the straggler fraction grows, whereas uncoded validation is bounded by the slowest worker.","Raising $K$ raises the critical spamming rate $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$, so the protocol can trade more validation work for a larger stable region against adversarial issuance.","Larger $K$ and lower spamming rates should produce shorter inter-chain finality times and a more even distribution of confirmed blocks across chains.","The claimed end-to-end guarantee would mean a user's escrowed transfer is either settled with conserved balances and no double spends, or released within finite expected time under the stated liveness conditions."],"supporting_citations":[{"why":"Supplies the modified IOTA Coordicide DAG design that SPID-Chain adapts for inter-consensus, including tip selection and aggregated-weight confirmation.","marker":"[47]"},{"why":"Provides the critical spamming rate $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$ that the paper imports for tip-pool stability.","marker":"[57]"},{"why":"Provides the recursive decoding algorithm used to reconstruct token-flow matrices from coded worker results.","marker":"[48]"},{"why":"Gives the information-theoretic foundation for resilient computing that justifies treating worker computations as voting for consensus.","marker":"[49]"},{"why":"Used to argue that tip-pool over-inflation raises orphan probability and extends finality time.","marker":"[59]"},{"why":"Supplies the Gini-coefficient baselines for Bitcoin and Ethereum against which SPID-Chain's decentralization is compared.","marker":"[58]"},{"why":"Provides real-world Ethereum transaction samples used to construct valid and invalid blocks in the simulations.","marker":"[56]"},{"why":"The GoShimmer DAG node implementation used in the prototype-assisted simulations.","marker":"[53]"}],"fun_headline_variants":["Polar-coded validation skips stragglers in cross-chain settlement","DAG settlement with coded checks survives Byzantine drag","SPID-Chain: coded state checks stabilize weighted DAG","Fast workers decide: coded validation for cross-chain credits"],"cache_read_input_tokens":30080,"weakest_assumption_plain":"The stability and security conclusions assume that the IOTA Coordicide tip-pool threshold $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$, derived for a different issuance and confirmation model, still governs SPID-Chain's stake-weighted DAG with aggregated-weight confirmation at $\\eta=67\\%$.","fun_headline_variants_meta":{"raw":{"variants":["Polar-coded validation skips stragglers in cross-chain settlement","DAG settlement with coded checks survives Byzantine drag","SPID-Chain: coded state checks stabilize weighted DAG","Fast workers decide: coded validation for cross-chain credits"]},"model":"deepseek-v4-flash","effort":"low","cost_usd":0.000454,"raw_usage":{"total_tokens":2325,"prompt_tokens":1029,"completion_tokens":1296,"prompt_tokens_details":{"cached_tokens":384},"prompt_cache_hit_tokens":384,"prompt_cache_miss_tokens":645,"completion_tokens_details":{"reasoning_tokens":1228}},"tokens_in":645,"tokens_out":1296,"duration_ms":10956,"temperature":1.0,"reasoning_tokens":1228,"cache_read_input_tokens":384,"cache_creation_input_tokens":0},"cache_creation_input_tokens":0},"created_at":"2026-08-10T17:52:29.948432+00:00","model_set":{"reader":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"falsifier":"Inspect the full text for the promised theorems: if Sections 2 through 6 contain no statement of the exact recovery-time distribution, the verification-soundness bound, the weighted-quorum condition, or the stability theorem, then the analytic claims are not established. Separately, run the simulation with weighted-AW confirmation at $\\eta=67\\%$ and measure tip-pool size for $\\mu$ just below and above $(K-1)/K$: the predicted transition should occur exactly at that threshold for the claim to hold.","supporting_citations":[{"cited_title":"Stability of local tip pool sizes","cited_arxiv_id":"2302.01625","evidence_quote":"Used to argue that tip-pool over-inflation raises orphan probability and extends finality time."},{"cited_title":null,"cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"Supplies the Gini-coefficient baselines for Bitcoin and Ethereum against which SPID-Chain's decentralization is compared."},{"cited_title":null,"cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"Supplies the modified IOTA Coordicide DAG design that SPID-Chain adapts for inter-consensus, including tip selection and aggregated-weight confirmation."},{"cited_title":"The security of the Coordicide: the implementation and analysis of possible attack vectors","cited_arxiv_id":"2205.12568","evidence_quote":"Provides the critical spamming rate $\\mu_{\\mathrm{crit}}=(K-1)/K$ that the paper imports for tip-pool stability."},{"cited_title":null,"cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"Provides the recursive decoding algorithm used to reconstruct token-flow matrices from coded worker results."},{"cited_title":null,"cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"Gives the information-theoretic foundation for resilient computing that justifies treating worker computations as voting for consensus."},{"cited_title":"Ethereum BigQuery public dataset for smart contract analytics","cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"Provides real-world Ethereum transaction samples used to construct valid and invalid blocks in the simulations."},{"cited_title":"[Online]","cited_arxiv_id":null,"evidence_quote":"The GoShimmer DAG node implementation used in the prototype-assisted simulations."}],"review_version":1}