A network security game shows random attacks cause under-investment at equilibrium versus social optimum, while strategic attacks yield over-investment when information dependencies are low and under-investment when high.
Let us preliminary recall the reward of agent i, Πi = 1− ∑ j a∗ j(1− qj)Pij− 1 2 αq2 i , (30) and that the equilibrium solves ∂Πi ∂qi = 0
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
cs.SI 1years
2019 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Protecting shared information in networks: a network security game with strategic attacks
A network security game shows random attacks cause under-investment at equilibrium versus social optimum, while strategic attacks yield over-investment when information dependencies are low and under-investment when high.